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NUMBERS AND PROPOSITIONS: REPLY TO MELIA 
By TIM CRANE 
IS THE WAY we use propositions to individuate beliefs and 
other intentional states analogous to the way we use numbers to 
measure weights and other physical magnitudes? In an earlier 
paper [2], I argued that there is an important disanalogy. One and 
the same weight can be 'related to' different numbers under 
different units of measurement. Moreover, the choice of a unit of 
measurement is arbitrary, in the sense that which way we choose doesn't affect the weight attributed to the object. But it makes 
little sense to say that one and the same belief can be related to 
different propositions: different proposition means different belief. 
So there is no analogous arbitrary choice. 
Joseph Melia disputes this [5]. He claims that on two theories of 
propositions, the same belief can be related to different proposi- 
tions, so that 'which object a thinker is related to by having a 
particular belief is relative to an arbitrary choice' ([5], p. 46). One 
such theory is the neo-Russellian theory of propositions as 
ordered n + 1-tuples. Fred's belief that a bears R to b can be con- 
sidered as a relation between Fred and the ordered triple 
<a,R,b>, or as a relation between Fred and the ordered triple 
< R,a,b >. These are different abstract objects, but since the choice 
between them doesn't affect the attribution of the belief that a 
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bears R to b to Fred, it is arbitrary which we choose as 'the object' to 
which Fred is related. 
The other theory is that propositions are sets of possible worlds. 
Fred's belief that a bears R to b can be considered as a relation 
between Fred and the set of worlds where a bears R to b, or as a 
relation between Fred and the set's characteristic function. Again, 
these are different abstract objects, but again it is arbitrary which 
we choose as 'the object' to which Fred is related. 
I agree with Melia that in both these cases, there is no interest- 
ing question about which abstract object Fred is 'really' related to 
in having this belief. But what is the significance of this? 
Melia thinks it undermines my claim that 'which abstract object 
a thinker is related to by having a particular belief is not relative 
to an arbitrary choice' ([5], p. 46). But I did not make this general 
claim. In fact, in my original paper I gave a counterexample to it: 
the same belief can be 'indexed' by different abstract sentence-types 
([2], p. 228). Fred's belief that snow is white can be considered as a 
relation to the Italian sentence 'La neve e bianca' or the German 
'Schnee ist weiss'. As with Melia's examples, the choice between 
these objects is arbitrary, in the sense that whichever way we 
choose, we attribute to Fred the belief that snow is white. 
Melia's examples, and this one, all illustrate that the same belief 
can be considered as a relation to some different abstract objects, 
relative to an arbitrary choice. I have no quarrel with this claim, 
since in effect I made it in my original paper. 
What I did deny was that the same belief could be related to 
two different propositions. But if this is right, and I accept Melia's 
examples, then doesn't it follow that ordered n + 1-tuples and sets 
of possible worlds cannot really be propositions? And doesn't this 
mean that I cannot be neutral on conceptions of propositions, as I 
claimed to be ([2], p. 224)? 
In a sense, of course, the question 'are ordered n + 1-tuples really 
propositions?' is a silly one. 'Proposition' is a technical term, and 
we can define it as we wish. Our definitions come to have signifi- 
cance only because of the roles propositions play in our theories 
of mind and language. As Melia correctly says, once we have said 
what these theoretical roles are, we then use the term 'the proposi- 
tion that p' to refer to whatever object plays this role ([5], p. 47). 
What are these roles? One role is that identified by Frege: a 
proposition is 'something for which the question of truth arises' 
([3], p. 20). Propositions are supposed to be the bearers of truth- 
values - so differences in proposition must correspond to differ- 
ences in truth-value bearer. Another role is that of being the 
objects of propositional attitudes. Propositions are ways the 
thinker takes (or wants etc.) the world to be - so differences in 
proposition must correspond to differences in the way the world is 
taken (or wanted etc.) to be. (For more on these roles, and tensions 
between them, see [6], pp. 66-70; [4], pp. 54-5, 57-9.) 
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How does this apply to the difference between <a,R,b > and 
<R,a,b > as the content of Fred's belief that a bears R to b? This 
difference cannot correspond to a difference in truth-value bearer. 
Nor can it correspond to a way the world is represented as being. 
The belief that a bears R to b represents the world as being such that 
a bears R to b - and on Melia's neo-Russellian theory this is 
expressed just as much by < a,R,b > as by < R,a,b >. 
So if propositions are supposed to play the roles mentioned 
above, the difference between <a,R,b> and <R,a,b> is not a 
difference in proposition, in any theoretically interesting sense of 
that term. From the perspective of the theory of propositions, 
whatever <a,R,b> can do, <R,a,b > can do too, and vice versa. 
And likewise with a set of possible worlds and its characteristic 
function. 
Perhaps we can minimize dispute here by talking of 'proposi- 
tion-roles' instead of propositions. Proposition-roles are different 
when there is a difference in the theoretical roles they play in 
giving an account of some semantic or psychological fact. Given 
this distinction, I can then agree with the neo-Russellian that 
<a,R,b > and <R,a,b> are different propositions. But I can say 
that they play the same proposition-role. And likewise with a set 
of possible worlds and its characteristic function. 
Melia and I should therefore agree that (a) the same belief can 
be indexed to certain distinct objects (e.g. sentences, ordered n +1- 
tuples etc.); and that (b) the same belief cannot be indexed to 
distinct proposition-roles. I think (a) was explicit in my original 
paper. (b) should have been, and I am grateful to Melia for 
alerting me to the need to make this point clear. 
So once we distinguish between the abstract objects some 
philosophers call 'propositions' and the theoretical roles they play, 
it is apparent that there is no real dispute between Melia and me. 
However, it is worth noting that a loosely analogous distinction 
can be made in the case of numbers (see [1]). On the theory that 
numbers are sets, the number 3 can be thought of as the set {0,{0},{0,{0}}} or as the set {{{0}}}. The choice between these two is 
arbitrary from the point of view of number theory, in the sense 
that what we can do with the number 3 is not affected by that 
choice. Yet they are different abstract objects. 
We might conclude from this, a Benacerraf does, that whatever 
else they are, numbers 'could not be sets at all' ([1], p. 285). Or we 
might maintain that numbers are sets, but distinguish between 
numbers and number-roles, as we have distinguished between 
propositions and proposition-roles. We might then say (to echo 
Melia) that when we talk of the number 3, we are not talking 
about an object but about 'a certain role an object may play'. We 
would then call whatever object plays the number-3-role 'the 
number 3'. The set {0,{0},{0,{0}}} or the set {{{0}}} could play this 
role but the choice between them is arbitrary. 
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It doesn't matter here whether this is the right thing to say 
about numbers. I only want to point out that the choice between {0,{0},{0,{0}}} and {{{0}}} as occupants of the number-3-role is 
analogous to the choice between <a,R,b > and <R,a,b > as occu- 
pants of the proposition-that-a bears R to b-role. This provides a 
useful way of illustrating my original point, as follows. 
Suppose we settle, by arbitrary stipulation, the choice between 
<a,R,b> and <R,a,b>, and the analogous choice between {0,{0},{0,{0}}} and {{{0}}}. Then in order to measure weight and 
other magnitudes, there is a further arbitrary choice to make: the 
choice of a unit of measurement. But there is no such further 
choice to make in the case of belief and other attitudes. Or to put 
the matter in terms of 'roles': the weight of a bag of sugar is 
preserved across variations in the 'number-roles' used to index it. 
But the belief that a bears R to b cannot be preserved across varia- 
tions in 'proposition-role' - as Melia in effect allows ([5], p. 47). 
This is the disanalogy I argued for in my original paper. The mere 
fact that the same belief can be construed as a relation to many 
different abstract objects is irrelevant. 
University College London, 
Gower Street, London WCIE 6B T 
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